SMT Online News Special: Part One

Brunt delivers verdict on nuclear security

31 Dec 08

The Health and Safety Executive has published Roger Brunt’s fulsome 24-page report on the state of security provision across the UK’s civil nuclear industry. What’s the verdict? In the first instalment of a two-part detailed evaluation, Brian Sims examines the findings.

By Brian Sims

Security in the civil nuclear industry is necessarily subject to regulation which is a direct reflectance of the UK’s international obligations, not to mention Best Practice. In particular, the UK is a party to the Convention on the Protection of Nuclear Material, and is duty bound to take full account of the recommendations made by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in its document entitled ‘The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities’.

Within the UK, security regulation for the civil nuclear industry was reviewed following the Twin Towers attacks of 2001. Subsequently, the Nuclear Industries Security Regulations 2003 came into being on 22 March that year in the wake of consultation involving the nuclear sector.

In all, there are 32 civil licensed nuclear sites in the UK, the responsibility for security at each of these resting with the operator (who must rigidly adhere to the 2003 regulations). Aligning with the IAEA’s recommendations, the Office for Civil Nuclear Security (OCNS) is the UK’s designated, competent security authority, regulating the civil nuclear industry on behalf of the Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform.

Pace of change increasing

Each year, the director of civil nuclear security – the present incumbent being Harwell-based Roger Brunt – reports to the minister of state for energy on the state of security for the industry, and the effectiveness of regulation measures.

Brunt’s latest overview has just been issued, and covers the period 1 April 2007 through to 31 March this year. During that ‘window’, the pace of change in the industry has continued to increase. The Government has endorsed the construction of a new generation of nuclear power plants as a low carbon, secure energy source, while the Nuclear Directorate at the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) has begun a generic design assessment of three potential power plant designs.

For its part, the OCNS’ priority has been to ensure that existing security measures are not only maintained but also subject to continual improvement. As will become apparent in Part Two of this News Special, a particular achievement during the ‘survey’ period has been the demonstrable success of the collaboration with the Defence Vetting Agency, which has delivered significant improvements in the service it offers the nuclear sector.

The initial part of Brunt’s report, however, concentrates on protective security. As you’d expect, there’s a good reason for that. The OCNS regulates security activity in the civil nuclear industry in four distinct yet interrelated areas of competence known collectively as protective security. Individually, those four areas encompass site security, transport security, information security and the security of personnel.

Every civil licensed nuclear site (and those that either use or store Category I-III nuclear material at other premises) must have a site security plan in operation. Those plans detail the standards, procedures and arrangements to be kept in place at all times. All operators have to submit their plans to the OCNS for approval prior to adoption. Thereafter, those plans become the basis against which a site is judged to be compliant with the regulations. They are deemed ‘live’ documents subject to constant scrutiny and review as necessary.

In his report, Brunt has commented: “I’m confident that, as a result of OCNS’ routine and no-notice inspections, and operators’ clear commitment to security, these plans remain current and comprehensive. There are effective security regimes in place across the civil nuclear industry.”

32 nuclear sites under the microscope

At the beginning of the reporting period, there were 48 extant approved site security plans, but in October 2007 Category III facility at Poole run by Siemens Power Generation came out of regulation. The OCNS now regulates 32 civil licensed nuclear sites, 14 tenants on six of those sites and one other nuclear location.

Brunt has been “particularly concerned” to ensure that security standards are maintained at licensed nuclear sites where the site licensee changes as a result of the Nuclear Decommissioning Agency’s programme of works. New site licensees have to adopt the existing site security plans. This maintains continuity and restricts the disclosure of detail to a ‘need to know’ basis only. Brunt encourages reviews once the licensee is up-to-speed, welcoming any initiatives that improve security regimes still further.

As is the case with regulation of private sector contractors by the Security Industry Authority, routine and regular inspections to enforce security provision are vital. In the past year, the HSE has authorised the recruitment of individual security inspectors to fill two existing vacancies within the OCNS and approved the recruitment of five more inspectors. Brunt refers to this as “major progress”.

For the purposes of achieving “a reasonable and sustainable regulatory workload”, the OCNS has – very sensibly, I would add – allocated responsibilities for specific sites to individual inspectors. In other words, one OCNS inspector looks after a number of similarly designed sites. Surely, inspection wouldn’t work if that were not the way it was being carried out?

During the current reporting period, 135 routine site inspections were conducted to ensure compliance, and a further 32 of the no-notice variety. On top of that, 149 temporary security plans (brought into being, for example, because of construction work at a given site) were inspected and approved.

Last reissued in May 2007, the Technical Requirements document is designed specifically to help operators comply with the Nuclear Industries Security Regulations. The document achieves this by setting out model security standards for them to adopt, but allows sufficient flexibility that operators have the chance to develop alternative ways in which to meet the regulatory requirements. Brunt believes this freedom of action is important. “The nature and diversity of civil licensed nuclear sites in the UK are such,” he suggested, “that local solutions to local security conditions are often more appropriate and effective”. How very true. This is genuinely a Regulator with vision.

Exercises based around counter-terrorism

Quite rightly, Brunt requires every civil licensed nuclear site operator to hold counter-terrorist response exercises at regular intervals. During this reporting period, 27 such exercises were conducted to test command and control arrangements, probe the interfaces between security agencies and encourage “healthy interaction between the safety and security management functions”.

Brunt is at pains to acknowledge a “clear demonstration of commitments to security by operators and their employees,” and openly congratulates them on the standards achieved. Within the Nuclear Directorate, Brunt reveals that future exercises will include a ‘safety phase’. Apparently, this has been endorsed by operators.

The IAEA guidance document refers to the protection of vital areas. These are defined as follows: ‘An area containing nuclear material or other radioactive material (including radioactive sources), equipment, systems or devices, the sabotage or failure of which – either alone or in combination – through malevolent acts could directly or indirectly result in unacceptable radiological consequences’.

It’s a major priority for the OCNS to make certain that these areas are effectively protected, but this demands a significant commitment from not only operators’ staff but also Nuclear Directorate safety inspectors. Brunt said: “Significant progress has been made.” The Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) has examined the OCNS’ vital area review methodology, and Brunt suggested in his report that he’s “looking forward to reading the outcome of the CPNI’s work”.

Security of radioactive waste and sources

Pulling no punches, Brunt has reiterated his views on the security of radioactive waste first voiced in a previous report. “I believe that the best place for radioactive waste in a long-term repository, having first been properly conditioned in line with the best research and technology available to ensure that it’s in a passive state. Until that aspiration is realised, there’s no option but to store radioactive waste on licensed nuclear sites. I require appropriate standards of security commensurate with the category of material and the activity level for all waste held on site.” No grey areas there, then.

Nationally, the Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs is responsible for the wider policy framework in relation to securing radioactive materials. At civil licensed nuclear sites, the OCNS regulates the security of radioactive sources. Inventories must be attached to each site security policy.

For its part, the OCNS has continued to support the Security Regulators’ Liaison Group (which comprises representations from other Government departments and agencies with the responsibility for protecting radioactive sources). The Group met in late 2007 and again in April of this year, latterly contributing to the production of protectively marked guidance – ‘Security Requirements for Radioactive Sources’ – which supports the implementation of the High Activity Sealed Radioactive Sources and Orphan Sources Regulations 2006.

Security briefings for senior managers

Brunt has reported that the OCNS ran a series of briefings on security for 24 senior managers – in May and November 2007, and again this May – at Porton Down. It’s a worthwhile exercise. The briefings offer a solid platform for these managers to develop a greater understanding of the threat to the industry posed by terrorism. From Brunt’s perspective, they are “a vital component in raising security awareness”.

In 2007, the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT) at the Home Office began a national review of security in hazardous industries, including the civil nuclear industry. In August last year, the OCNS submitted a protectively marked paper to the Home Office describing security provision in the civil nuclear sector, emphasising in particular the UK’s international obligations, the modern regulatory system and the very clear obligations placed upon all site operators.

At the same time the OSCT was conducting its work, Brunt had ordered a review of the planning assumptions against which security profiles at civil licensed nuclear sites were set. The project was classified in nature, drawing on material supplied by the national intelligence agencies which allowed a judgement to be made with respect to the malicious capabilities that could be deployed against a licensed nuclear site (and which any security measures must therefore protect against).

“That project is now complete,” explained Brunt in his report. “The operators have begun vulnerability assessments, testing their existing security measures against this revised set of adversary malicious capabilities. The findings will be reflected in due course, as appropriate, in site security plans.”

The Civil Nuclear Constabulary: an appraisal

Brunt is the man tasked with designating which of the civil licensed nuclear sites should have an on-site armed response capability and, in a similar vein, which movements of nuclear material ought to benefit from having an armed escort. The UK’s policy, of course, is that this protection must be provided by the police service and not an organisation from the private sector.

To this end, the Civil Nuclear Constabulary (CNC) was formed back in April 2005 from the United Kingdom’s Atomic Energy Authority Constabulary. It operates under the direction of the Civil Nuclear Police Authority (CNPA), and is wholly funded by the civil nuclear industry.

As stated, the industry is experiencing a period of increasingly rapid and profound change. That change is already beginning to affect the CNC. For example, certain developments at a site can mean there’s no longer any requirement for a dedicated, on-site armed response team. During the period under study, the Low Level Waste Repository was reclassified as a Category IV licensed nuclear site. What, one wonders, is Brunt’s view of this? “I welcome the release and redeployment of CNC officers to other duties appropriate to their skills as alternative security arrangements are introduced.”

On a number of occasions post-September 2006, Brunt has actively encouraged the CNPA to develop the CNC’s training structures and programmes, concentrating in particular on the skills needed by CNC authorised firearms officers in fulfilling their rather unique role.

“Training keeps individuals focused and motivated,” stressed Blunt, “prevents ‘skill fade’ and increases the confidence that, when an individual is confronted by a contingency of any sort, then they’ll react both promptly and appropriately.”

Brunt is grateful for the opportunities the chairman of the CNPA has afforded to discuss his views on training, and welcomes “the willingness shown by civil nuclear industry representatives on the CNPA to provide additional resources for training.”